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I INTRODUCTION 
Both New Zealand ("NZ") and the United l(jngdom ("UK") have expressed 
domestic commitment to international human rights instruments. In particular, the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ("BORA") was enacted to fulfill international 
obligations resulting from ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights ("ICCPR"). 1 Likewise, the UK's ratification of the European 
Convention on Human Rights ("the Convention") instigated the Human Rights Act 
1998 (UK) ("HRA").2 As such, the Acts aim to fulfil] international obligations by 
giving effect to human rights guarantees. 
The HRA is extensively modelled on the BORA,3 and the two Acts are 
comparable in terms of their status within similar constitutional structures. NZ and 
the UK are both democracies theoretically based on Parliamentary government and in 
practice controlled mainly by the Executive branch.4 The BORA and the HRA both 
have the status of ordinary statutes. Courts have no power to invalidate conflicting 
legislation; Parliament is able to enact legi slation which limits or ovenides their 
. . 5 
prov1s1ons. 
1New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, long title . 
2 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), introduction. 
3 Anthony Lester QC "Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation Under the Human Rights Act 
1998" (Speech to New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Victoria University, Wellington, 9 
April 2002) 2; However, the extent to which the BORA influenced the HRA is not known 
since the Lord Chancellor and the Home Secretary have refused access, for another 28 years, 
to the civil service policy studies upon which Ministerial decisions were made in shaping the 
HRA. (Anthony Lester QC, "The Magnetism of the Human Rights Act 1998," (Speech to Roles 
and Perspectives on the Law Conference, Victoria University, Wellington, 4-5 April 2002) 5.) 
' Anthony Lester QC "Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation Under the Human Rights Act 
1998" above, 1. However the adoption of MMP in NZ has led to an increase in multi-party 
representation in Parliament and a consequent lessening of the Executive's ability to 
dominate Parliament. 
5 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s4, provides: 
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or after 
the commencement of this Bill of Rights), -
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to 
be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment -
By reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of Rights; 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), s3, provides: 
(1) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation 
must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention 
rights. 
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However, by virtue of s3(a) BORA and s6 HRA, the Acts' provisions do bind 
the functioning of the respective legislatures.6 Passing legislation is the primary 
parliamentary function; consequently the obligations of the UK and NZ Parliaments 
pursuant to international treaties require the upholding of human rights guarantees 
through legislation. This includes ensuring all legislation which is passed is 
consistent with the international human rights enshrined in the BORA and the HRA. 
This is reinforced by obligations pursuant to the international human rights 
instruments which gave rise to the Acts. Specifically, Article One of the Convention 
requires states to secure to those within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms it 
sets out.7 Similarly, the preamble to the ICCPR refers to the obligation of states to 
promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms. 8 
Upholding human rights is not solely the preserve of Parliament, however. 
The judiciary also makes a contribution in this regard by identifying, and adjudicating 
on, human rights breaches. Furthe1more, judicial declarations that legislation is 
incompatible with the BORA or the HRA are expressly authorised by the UK Act9 
and are a possibility under the NZ Act. 10 However, such declarations do not 
necessarily trigger changes to legislation. In the UK and NZ constitutions which are 
(2) This section -
(a) applies to primary legislation and subordinate legislation whenever 
enacted; 
(b) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any 
incompatible primary legislation; and 
(c) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any 
incompatible subordinate legislation if (disregarding any possibility of 
revocation) primary legislation prevents removal of the incompatibility. 
6 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s3(a), provides: 
This Bill of Rights applies only to acts done -
(a) By the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the government of New 
Zealand; 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), s6(1), provides: 
It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right. 
7 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 1. 
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, preamble. 
9 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), s4. 
10 Andrew S Butler "Judicial Indications of Inconsistency -A New Weapon in the 
Bill of Rights Armoury?" [2000] NZ Law Rev 43, 60; Moonen v Film nnd Literature Board of 
Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 17; Simpson v Attorney-General [Bnigent's Case] [1994] 3 NZLR 667, 676 
per Cooke P. 
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premised on parliamentary sovereignty, judicial declarations as well as the HRA's and 
BORA's provisions ultimately can be overridden by the legislature. Therefore, in the 
context of such a system, the contribution of Parliament will be most vital in ensuring 
compliance with human rights. 11 The most effective aspect of Parliament's role in 
preventing breaches of human rights is making sure legislation is drafted consistently 
with them. That is because, firstly, where the judiciary has little power to enforce 
legislative compliance with human rights once legislation is passed, pre-enactment 
scrutiny is the most effective means of ensuring compliance. Moreover, "from the 
point of view of citizens whose human rights are threatened, it is much better to 
prevent any infringement of those rights being included in legislation in the first 
place, rather than their having to wait for redress from the courts, perhaps many years 
later." 12 Secondly, the creation of a "human rights culture" within Parliament and 
government departments may help protect human rights from being breached by 
legislative acts. It can thus be concluded that upholding human rights through 
parliamentary scrutiny of proposed legislation is fundamental to the fulfilment of the 
objectives of the BORA and the HRA, in terms of meeting international obligations 
through upholding human rights. 
Complementary to these practical arguments is the consideration of principle. 
As David Kinley points out, 13 it is consistent with democratic concepts that elected 
legislators rather than appointed judges take most responsibility for legally protecting 
h · h 14 uman ng ts. 
Section 7 BORA and section 19 HRA provide for parliamentary scrutiny of 
Bills. The sections attempt to provide for legislative compliance with human rights 
guarantees. As demonstrated, the two provisions can be seen as fundamental to the 
workings of the Acts as a whole. This paper compares the effectiveness of the two 
provisions, focusing on the models adopted by NZ and the UK pursuant to the 
parliamentary scrutiny requirements. In order to assess "effectiveness," that tenn 
11 David Kinley "Parliamentary Scrutiny of Human Rights: A Duty Neglected?" in Philip 
Alston (ed) Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1999) 158, 160. 
12 Michael Ryle " Pre-legislative Scrutiny: A Prophylactic Approach to Protection of Human 
Rights" Public Law [1994] 192, 197. 
" Kinley, above, 158. 
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must be defined. This will be done by reference to the goals of sections 7 and 19, and 
those of the BORA and the HRA themselves. 
It has already been established that the BORA and the HRA aim to give effect 
to international human rights obligations. The sections 7 and 19 parliamentary 
scrutiny processes primarily aim to assist the legislatures in this goal by passing 
human rights-consistent legislation. However, legislative compliance with both Acts 
is subject to the Parliaments' ability to derogate from human rights norms.
15 As a 
result, any assessment of the effectiveness of section 7 BORA and section 19 HRA 
must acknowledge this limitation. But given that the Acts apply to acts done by the 
legislature, derogations should ideally be minimised. Furthermore, they should take 
place by deliberate decision rather than inadvertent oversight. Moreover, in a 
democratic society, derogations from human rights by Parliament should be publicly 
known in order that the electorate maintain the ability to make Members of 
Parliament accountable for their actions. Therefore, the relative effectiveness of the 
parliamentary scrutiny provisions will be determined based on the ability of the two 
processes firstly to assist the legislature in upholding human rights, and secondly to 
inform public and parliamentary debate in relation to potential derogations from those 
rights. 
Given the importance of parliamentary scrutiny of legislation for human rights 
breaches in the context of the UK and NZ constitutional structures, this paper seeks to 
draw conclusions from the comparison between the two models. It recommends some 
possible improvements to the NZ model. These are based on rectifying identified 
weaknesses in the NZ model, and adopting strengths from the UK model. The 
recommendations focus on enhancing the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny. 
Specifically, it will be shown that the procedures adopted to implement section 7 fail 
to realise the objectives of that provision, and consequently those of the BORA as a 
whole. The recommendations therefore suggest alterations to the manner in which the 
procedure is canied out in practice and to the procedure as outlined in the Attorney-
General's Memorandum. 16 A second tier of legislative scrutiny is also suggested as 
" Kinley, above, 159. 
1'New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s4; Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), s3. 
16 Memorandum entitled "Monitoring Bills for Compliance with the New Zealand Bill of 
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an improvement to the effectiveness of section 7. 
II SECTION 7 NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990 
First, the NZ parliamentary scrutiny procedure will be examined. Section 7 of 
the BORA was modelled on procedures for vetting legislation under the Canadian Bill 
of Rights 1960 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 17 Section 3 of the 
Canadian Bill of Rights 1960 provides: 18 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the Minister of Justice shall, in accordance with such 
regulations as may be prescribed by the Governor in Council, examine every 
proposed regulation submitted in draft form to the Clerk of the Privy Council 
pursuant to the Statutory Instruments Act and every Bill introduced in or 
presented to the House of Commons by a Minister of the Crown, in order to 
ascertain whether any of the provisions thereof are inconsistent with the 
purposes and provisions of this Part and he shall report any such inconsistency to 
the House of Commons at the first convenient opportunity. 
(2) A regulation need not be examined in accordance with subsection (1) if prior to 
being made it was examined as a proposed regulation in accordance with section 
3 of the Statutory Instruments Act to ensure that it was not inconsistent with the 
purposes and provisions of this Part. 
Prior to the Canadian Bill of Rights being effectively superceded by the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 19 section 3 was considered to have the potential to 
ensure legislative consistency with the Canadian Bill of Rights.
20 However, this may 
be largely because, unlike the BORA, the Canadian Bill was interpreted to render 
invalid or inoperative statutes inconsistent with the rights contained in it. 21 As well, 
section 3 was seen as a means of deterring the proposal of legislation which abrogated 
Rights Act 1990" from Attorney-General to all Ministers and Chief Executives, 9 April 1991. 
See Appendix. 
17 Geoffrey Palmer New Zenlnnd's Constitution in Crisis: Reforming our Politicnl System (Mclndoe, 
Dunedin, 1992) 59-60. 
18 Canadian Bill of Rights SC 1960 c44 s3. 
19 Peter W Hogg Constitutionnl Law of Cnnndn (4ed, Carswell, Ontario, 1997) 788. 
20 Walter Surma Tarnopolsky The Canndinn Bill of Rights (2ed, McClelland and Stewart, 
Toronto, 1975) 128. 
21 The opening words of the Canadian Bill of Rights SC 1960 c44, s2, provide: 
Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament 
of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so 
construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorise the 
abrogation, abridgement or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein 
recognised and declared, and in particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or 
applied so as to ... 
These opening words are followed by a detailed list of legal civil liberties; Peter W Hogg 
Constitutionnl Law of Cnnndn (4ed, Carswell, Ontario, 1997) 795. 
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rights. 22 That is, the effectiveness of the provision lay in the threat that it would be 
invoked. 
Section 7 of the BORA provides: 23 
Where any Bill is introduced into the House of Representatives, the Attorney-General 
shall 
(a) In the case of a Government Bill, on the introduction of that Bill; or 
(b) In any other case as soon as practicable after the introduction of the Bill, 
Bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any provision in the Bill that 
appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms in this Bill of Rights. 
The first notable difference between section 7 and section 3 of the Canadian Bill of 
Rights is that subordinate legislation is not mentioned in the NZ provision. This is 
discussed further below. The second difference is that the NZ provision is more 
specific as to when the House has to be alerted regarding an inconsistency. This may 
seek to resolve the controversy which arose under the Canadian model over the 
. h" h 24 appropnate stage at w 1c to report. 
Section 7 places a positive duty on the Attorney-General to report a Bill's 
inconsistencies with the BORA to Parliament. In theory, this duty would assist in 
ensming that rights and freedoms are "affirmed, protected and promoted"25 by 
enabling the legislature to rectify potential derogations from those rights. At the least, 
it should "ensure that members of Parliament are fully aware of the consequences of 
the passing of a particular Bill as proposed."26 This purpose differs from that of the 
deteITence-focused section 3 of the Canadian Bill of Rights. Section 7 then, has the 
potential to be effective in providing for the legislature to act consistently with its 
international obligations and in keeping Parliament informed regarding BORA issues. 
In order to assess whether practical reality accords with this theory, it is necessary to 
examine the procedure implemented to uphold section 7. 
22 Tarnopolsky, above, 128. 
n New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s7. 
2
' Tarnopolsky, above, 126-128. 
25 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, long title. 
20 Mnngnwnro Enterprises Ltd v Attorney-General (1994] 2 NZLR 451, 458 (HC). 
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A Procedure 
The Crown Law Office and the Ministry of Justice have developed procedures 
for vetting Bills for compliance with the BORA. The procedures have been 
established in response to a Memorandum from the Attorney-General, which seeks to 
implement section 7's requirements. 27 These bodies then advise the Attorney-General 
of their findings so that, if necessary, he or she can submit a report pursuant to section 
7. The procedures are based on sections 4, 5 and 6 of the BORA and comprise the 
following steps: 28 
The first stage is to assess the provisions of the legislation for compliance with the 
rights and freedoms within the Bill of Rights Act. This involves: 
Weighing the different interpretations of the apparently inconsistent provision; 
Ascertaining the scope of the right apparently breached; and 
Assessing the provision in light of the right itself to ascertain whether the provision 
in fact breaches the right. 
If there is an inconsistency, the second stage is to ask: is this a "reasonable limit ... 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" (section 5 of the Bill of Rights 
Act). The test for this question is the Moonen test, which has two components: 
Is the limit substantively justified? -- the reason for the limitation must be of 
sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right. 
Is the limit proportional? -- there must be proportionality between the law limiting 
the right and the reason for the limitation. The measures adopted must impair the 
right as little as possible. 
The LAC guidelines go on to describe the basic content of the BORA rights.
29 Where 
an inconsistency is found to be unjustified, a section 7 report is prepared for the 
Attorney-General by the Ministry of Justice, or, in the case of Bills promoted by the 
Ministry of Justice, the Crown Law Office. The report is then tabled in the House by 
the Attorney-General. 30 
The process as a whole aims to ensure legislation is consistent with the BORA 
27 Memorandum entitled "Monitoring Bills for Compliance with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990" from Attorney-General to all Ministers and Chief Executives, 9 April 1991. 
28Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation 2000 edition: 
Chapter 4: New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and Human Rights Act 1993, para 4.1.1 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz / lac / pubs/2001 / legislative __ guide __ 2000 / chapter __ 4.html> (last 
accessed 18 June 2002). 
29 Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation 2000 edition: Chapter 4: New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 and Human Rights Act 1993, above, para 4.1.2. 
30 Guidelines on Process and Con ten t of Legislation 2000 edition: Chapter 4: New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 and Human Rights Act 1993, above, para 4.1.1. 
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wherever possible.31 It also attempts to ensure that legislation which derogates from 
Bill of Rights guarantees does so as a result of deliberate, considered decision rather 
than inadvertent oversight. 32 Further, section 7 reports seek to promote informed 
public and parliamentary debate regarding inconsistencies in proposed legislation. 33 
This is in part effected by their tabling in Parliament for debate and by being placed 
on the web. 34 
B Limitations in the Procedure 
Certain features of the section 7 reporting process hinder its effectiveness. The 
first of these is the narrow scope which has been afforded the reporting procedure. 
Although the Attorney-General's duty to report inconsistencies is unqualified, in 
practice reports are only tabled where inconsistencies appear to be unjustified in a free 
and democratic society. 35 This practice is a result of the application of the procedure 
which has been outlined and limits the extent of the legislature's compliance with the 
BORA in several ways. 
Primarily, it fails to draw the attention of the House to BORA inconsistencies 
except in the case of those which cannot be justified. This limits the extent to which 
the reports can aid public and parliamentary debate in relation to legislative 
compliance with the BORA. For example, where a report is not made, it is not clear 
whether this is because the proposed legislation has raised no BORA issues, or 
because the inconsistencies the Bill has exhibited were found to be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.36 This constraint is of further concern given 
that the test adopted in response to section 7 requires personal or value judgments to 
be made at some points by public servants on behalf of the Attorney-General. These 
31 Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation 2000 edition: Chapter 4: New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 and Human Rights Act 1993, above, para 4.1.2. 
32 Paul Fitzgerald "Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: A very practical 
power or a well-intentioned nonsense" (1992) 22 VUWLR 135, 136. 
13 Mangawaro Enterprises Ltd v Attorney-General [1994] 2 NZLR 451, 457 (I-IC). 
34 The section 7 reports can be found at "Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives" 
<http: / / www.clerk.govt.nz> (last accessed 24 August 2002) . 
3
' New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s5, provides: 
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill 
of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
36 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s5. 
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judgments are not subject to any scrutiny where a section 7 report is not made, and 
public service procedures are not transparent. As well, the public service officials 
who make the judgments are not elected. This further reduces their accountability. 
The subjectivity of the section 7 test also increases the likelihood of errors, or at least 
of contestable decisions,37 and consequently of the legislature limiting human rights 
inadvertently where the Attorney-General decides not to report. 
All these factors increase the need for checks on section 7 decisions. However, 
Parliament and the public have no opportunity to check the procedures followed and 
criteria applied by departments apart from the section 7 reports published on the web. 
In addition, the public will not be made aware of any potential inconsistencies where 
the Attorney-General does not rep011. This limits their ability to act as a check on a 
Parliament that chooses to derogate from their rights. The problem is certainly a valid 
one, since the media and public seem to take seriously their involvement with the 
section 7 process. This is evidenced by the publicity given to the section 7 report on 
the Land Transport (Street and Illegal Drag Racing) Amendment Bill, otherwise 
known as the "Boy-racer Bill." The Attorney-General's finding that the power given 
to police to seize and impound cars for 28 days was an unjustified limitation on 
BORA rights38 appears to have been the subject of fairly widespread public debate.
39 
The subjectivity inherent in the section 7 reporting and the high threshold
40 
which must be reached for a report to be triggered are exacerbated by the fact that the 
process gone through in deciding whether or not to report is not subject to public 
scrutiny through the Official Information Act 1982. Once again, this potentially 
places limitations on legislative compliance with BORA rights and precludes 
informed debate on inconsistencies. Section 7 reports are tabled in Parliament so, 
37 Andrew S Butler "The Bill of Rights Debate: Why the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is 
a Bad Model for Britain" Oxford Journal of Legal Studies vol 171997 323, 335-336. 
38 Attorney-General Report Under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Land 
Transport (Street and Illegal Drag Racing) Amendment Bill 2002 AJHR [2002] E 63. 
39 For example, Jonathan Milne "Confiscation of cars against Bill of Rights" (8 June 2002) The 
Dominion Wellington l; "Ignore Bill of Rights at Your Peril" (10 June 2002) The Evening 
Stnndnrd Palmerston North 7; [No Published Headline] (13 June 2002) The Timnru Herald 
Timaru 4. 
'
0 A "low threshold" interpretation would arise from a plain reading of section 7 such that 
whenever a provision in a Bill being introduced is inconsistent with the BORA, a report will 
be triggered. (Paul Fitzgerald "Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: A very 
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where they are made, the Attorney-General's legal advice is available to the public. 
However, where for whatever reason the Attorney-General does not report, the 
reasons for this decision are not presented to the public. The Ombudsman found in 
1999 that the Attorney-General, when acting in that capacity, is not subject to the 
Official Information Act. 41 Further, legal advice provided to the Attorney-General by 
the Ministry of Justice in relation to a paiticular Bill was found to be held by the 
Attorney-General in that capacity.42 As a result, legal advice pertaining to section 7 
BORA reports does not fall under the Official Infotmation Act 1982 and thus does not 
have to be provided on request. 43 In practice, BORA vets are copied to the Minister 
of Justice and the Minister promoting the Government Bill, who are subject to the 
Official Information Act.44 They must provide official information on request. 
However, applications for the disclosure of legal advice can always be refused under 
the Act.45 While legal professional p1ivilege can be waived, the Attorney-General 
does not normally do this in relation to BORA vets.46 The failure to systematically 
release BORA vets significantly restricts the amount of information which is available 
to Parliament and the public as to the consistency of proposed legislation with the 
BORA. It is only in the small number of instances where the Attorney-General finds 
an unjustified limitation on rights47 that any comprehensive analysis of compatibility 
has to be publicised. Openness of the parliamentary scrutiny process is vital to the 
fulfillment of the BORA objectives of promoting parliamentary and public debate. 
Moreover, a process which is both subjective and confidential must be inherently 
flawed in its ability to ensure consistency with BORA norms. The effectiveness of 
the section 7 process is thus significantly impeded by its confidentiality. 
As mentioned, section 7 does not apply to secondary legislation.48 This places a 
potentially serious limitation on its effectiveness, especially given the large number of 
practical power or a well-intentioned nonsense" (1992) 22 VUWLR 135, 137.) 
41 th 
12 Compendium of Case Notes of the Ombudsmen Case No. W41067 (Office of the 
Ombudsmen, New Zealand, 2000) 167. 
G ~ C b 12 Compendium of Case Notes of the Ombudsmen ase No. W41067, a ove, 167. 
,, ,h C 12 Compendium of Case Notes of the Ombudsmen ase No. W41067, above, 167-168. 
" Official Information Act 1982, s2. 
45 Official Information Act 1982, s9(2)(h). 
'
6 This information was provided by Kelly Harris from the Ministry of Justice. 
47 The Attorney-General has so far reported on 23 Bills. 
48 No instruments other than Bills are referred to in section 7. (New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990, s7.) 
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regulations that is passed every year49 and that they often effect the policy provided 
for in legislation. As such, where they breach BORA rights, they correspondingly 
limit executive compliance with human rights. Regulations are not currently vetted 
under the section 7 procedure.so This inhibits the procedure's effectiveness. Although 
important, this issue is one which concerns executive compliance with the BORA and 
as a result is beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses on legislative compliance. 
The tabling of the section 7 report takes place on introduction of Government 
Bills and as soon as practical after introduction of other Bills.s 1 This is very early in 
the legislative process; many and substantial amendments to proposed legislation may 
be implemented after its introduction. The section 7 reporting requirement is not 
ongoing, so it fails to flag inconsistencies which may arise following any amendments 
to a Bill.s2 Clearly, opportunities arise for the legislature inadvertently or covertly to 
derogate from BORA guarantees. This could occur without any, or much less 
informed, parliamentary and public debate. This runs contrary to the spirit of section 
7 and the BORA itself. One such example occurred with the Criminal Justice 
Amendment Act (No 2) 1999. Section 2(4) of the amending Act inserted a new s 
80(2A) into the Criminal Justice Act 1985. The new provision sets out minimum 
periods of imprisonment for home invasion murders which are to apply even if the 
offence has been committed before the date on which the amendment came into 
force.s 3 In R v Poumakos4 the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the new provision 
is inconsistent with section 25(g) BORA, which sets out the principle against 
retrospective increased penalties.ss However, the offending provisions were adopted 
49 422 regulations were published in 2001 under the Acts and Regulations Publication Act 
1989 in the SR series. (Regulations Review Committee" Activities of the Regulations Review 
Committee during 2001" [2002] AJHR I 16J.) 
50 Although, the grounds of complaint to the Regulations Review Committee include that a 
regulation "trespasses unduly on personal rights and liberties." (Standing Orders s382(2)(b).) 
51 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s7. 
'
2 David McGee Pnrlinmentnry Practice in New Zenlnnd (2ed, GP Publications, Wellington, 1994) 
296; Anthony Lester QC "Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation Under the Human Rights Act 
1998" (Speech to New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Victoria University, Wellington, 9 
April 2002) 4. 
'
3 Criminal Justice Amendment Act (no 2) 1999, s2(4). 
54 [2000] 2 NZLR 695. 
55 R v Poumnko [2000] 2 NZLR 695, 700; New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s25(g), provides: 
Minimum standards of criminal procedure - Everyone who is charged with an 
offence has, in relation to the determination of the charge, the following minimum 
rights: 
14 
by supplementary order paper during the Committee of the Whole House stage of the 
legislative process and as a result were not the subject of any report to the House 
under section 7 BORA.56 This legislative act was thus carried out without 
acknowledgement of the fact that it breached a BORA right. Such an example clearly 
demonstrates a weakness in the section 7 process which significantly undermines its 
effectiveness. 
Finally, further detriment to the effectiveness of the section 7 process is caused 
by its lack of enforceability. In Mangawaro Enterprises v Attorney-General57 the 
plaintiffs wanted the Forests Amendment Act 1993 declared void because the 
Attorney-General had not identified its alleged inconsistencies with the BORA, as 
required by section 7. 58 Gallen J found that the Attorney-General's obligations under 
section 7 are "proceedings in Parliament" in terms of article 9(1) of the Bill of Rights 
1688 (UK).59 Thus, to question the Attorney-General's decision not to report would 
constitute usurping the authority of the democratically-elected legislature.60 
However, if there is no way to monitor the Attorney-General's compliance with 
section 7, this must substantially weaken the provision ' s ability to inform Parliament 
and the public of the consequences of passing legislation and in tum weaken it as a 
safeguard of rights. 
The high threshold, subjective test combined with the confidentiality of the 
section 7 process significantly impair its ability to meet its objectives and those of the 
BORA as a whole. Moreover, those who carry out the section 7 procedures do so 
with minimal transparency and accountability to the electorate and the courts. These 
factors consequently weaken to a considerable degree the potential to achieve the 
objectives of ensuring legislative compliance with BORA guarantees and promoting 
(g) The right, if convicted of an offence in respect of which the penalty has been 
varied between the commission of the offence and sentencing, to the benefit of the 
lesser penalty. 
56 R v Poumako, above, 700. 
57 Mangawaro Enterprises Ltd v Attorney-General [1994] 2 NZLR 451, 457 (HC). 
'8 Mangawaro Enterprises Ltd v Attorney-General, above, 453. 
59 Mangawaro Enterprises Ltd v Attorney-General, above, 455; Bill of Rights Act 1688 (UK), 
Article 9(1), provides: 
Freedom of speech - that the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in 
Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of 
Parliament. 
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public and parliamentary debate regarding legislative derogations from those 
guarantees. In practice, the section 7 model is not the "potent weapon" it was 
predicted to become. 61 Such weaknesses are further highlighted by comparison with 
the UK parliamentary scrutiny procedure. 
III SECTION 19 HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 (UK) 
As discussed, the enactment of section 19 of the HRA was influenced by section 
7 of the BORA. Section 19 provides: 62 
(1) A Minister of the Crown in charge of a Bill in either House of Parliament must, 
before Second Reading of the Bill -
(a) make a statement to the effect that in his view the provisions of the Bill are 
compatible with the Convention rights ("a statement of compatibility"); or 
(b) make a statement to the effect that although he is unable to make a 
statement of compatibility the government wishes the House to proceed 
with the Bill. 
(2) The statement must be in writing and be published in such a manner as the 
Minister making it considers appropriate. 
The objectives of the provision are comparable to those of section 7 BORA. That is, 
it was stated in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill, that it is "highly desirable 
for the government to ensure as far as possible that legislation which is places before 
Parliament in the normal way is compatible with the Convention rights , and for 
Parliament to ensure that the human rights implications of legislation are subject to 
proper consideration before the legislation is enacted."63 Therefore, the process 
attempts to ensure legislation is consistent with the HRA guarantees and to inform 
public and parliamentary debate in relation to potential derogations from those 
guarantees. However, the process adopted to fulfil! the section 19 requirement is 
much broader in scope than its NZ equivalent.
64 
60 Mangawaro Enterprises Ltd v Attorney-General, above, 458-9. 
61 Geoffrey Palmer New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis: Reforming our Political System (Mclndoe, 
Dunedin, 1992) 59. 
62 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
61 Anthony Lester QC "Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation Under the Human Rights Act 
1998" (Speech to New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Victoria University, Wellington, 9 
April 2002) 2; Rights Brought Home: the Human Rights Bill (1997) CM 3782, para3.l. 
(,.I Lester, above, 2; Memorandum entitled "Monitoring Bills for Compliance with the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990" from Attorney-General to all Ministers and Chief Executives, 
9 April 1991. 
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A Procedure 
At the policy approval stage, the relevant department highlights for its Minister 
the Convention issues which may arise under the proposed legislation.65 Then at the 
drafting stage, the department's lawyers prepare a report which underpins the 
Minister's section 19 statement.66 In line with the NZ counterpart, formal procedures 
have been developed for preparing statements of compatibility.67 
As in NZ, a test for compatibility is applied to Bills. A section 19(a) statement 
is regarded as a "positive statement of compatibility" such that, in order to make one, 
the arguments must, at least on balance, support compatibility.68 Legal advisers must 
therefore consider whether the relevant provisions would on balance be likely to 
withstand challenge on Convention grounds in the domestic courts and the European 
Court of Human Rights ("Strasbourg Court.")69 If this standard is not met, a section 
19(b) statement should be made. Policy guidelines emphasise that a section 19(b) 
statement does not indicate that provisions are incompatible with the Convention, but 
merely that a positive statement of compatibility cannot be made.70 Both section 
19(a) and section 19(b) statements are presented by the Minister in a prescribed 
form. 71 
In determining compatibility, departments apply a senes of tests to decide 
which , if any, Convention rights are relevant. In relation to each of the Articles, the 
Guidance for Departments sets out substantive requirements for ensuring 
compliance.72 The process followed in complying with section 19 of the HRA is 
ex tensi vel y prescribed. 
65Lord Chancellor's Department The Humn n Rights Act 1998 Guidnnce for Depnrtments, para 34 
<http:/ / www.humanrights.gov .uk/guidance.htm> (last accessed 19 June 2002). 
66 The Humnn Rights Act 1998 Guidnnce for Depnrtments, above, para 36. 
67 The Humnn Rights Act 1998 Guidnnce for Depnrtments, above. 
68 The Humnn Rights Act 1998 Guidnnce for Depnrtments, above, para 36. 
69 The Human Rights Act 1998 Guidnnce for Depnrtments, above, para 36. 
70Lord Chancellor's Department The Humnn Rights Act 1998 Guidance for Departments, para 36 
<http: / / www.humanrights.gov.uk / guidance.htm> (last accessed 19 June 2002). 
71 The Humnn Rights Act 1998 Guidnnce for Depnrtments, above, para 37; for the format of the 
prescribed form, see Annex A to The Hwnnn Rights Act 1998 Guidance for Departments. 
n The Humnn Rights Act 1998 Guidance for Departments, above, paras 41-78. 
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Further practice has been established in the UK for ensuring compliance with 
section 19 in the form of a Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights ("the 
Joint Committee.")73 The Joint Committee's terms of reference74 include assessing 
the compatibility of draft legislation with Convention guarantees.75 It now regards 
scrutinising ministerial section 19 statements as a "key duty."76 The Joint 
Committee's role includes monitoring the section 19 process and reporting to 
Parliament as to the HRA compatibility of proposed legislation.77 The test applied to 
determine compatibility incorporates the principles of legal certainty and 
proportionality.78 In combination, the preparation of section 19 statements of 
73 UK Parliament, Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
<http:/ /www.parliament.uk/commons/selcom/hrhome.htm> (last accessed 19 June 2002). 
74 UK Parliament, Joint Committee on Human Rights, above: the Joint Committee's terms of 
reference are: 
To consider: 
(a) matters relating to human rights in the United Kingdom (but excluding 
consideration of individual cases); 
(b) proposals for remedial orders, draft remedial orders and remedial orders made 
under section 10 of and laid under Schedule 2 to the Human Rights Act 1998; and 
(c) in respect of draft remedial orders and remedial orders, whether the special 
attention of the House should be drawn to them on any of the grounds specified 
in Standing Order 73 Qoint Committee on Statutory Instruments) . 
75Joint Committee on Human Rights, First Report, Session 2000-01, Criminal Justice and Police 
Bill (26 April 2001). 
76Joint Committee on Human Rights, Fourteenth Report, Session 2001-02, Scrutiny of Bills: 
Private Members' Bills and Private Bills (8 March 2002), para l. 
n Anthony Lester QC "Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation Under the Human Rights Act 
1998" (Speech to New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Victoria University, Wellington, 9 
April 2002) 5-6. 
78 Joint Committee on Human Rights, First Report, Session 2000-01, above, Annex 2: 
Legal certainty requires: 
if an interference with a right is to be justifiable, it must be lawful, and: 
(1) the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an 
indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a 
given case; 
(2) a norm cannot be regarded as law unless it is formulated with sufficient precision 
to enab le the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able - if need be with 
appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, 
the consequences which a given action may entail. 
The principle of proportionality requires decision-makers: 
to balance the severity of the interference with the intensity of the social need for 
action. Proportionality has a number of elements. They have never been codified, but 
the following factors are often relevant. 
(1) An interference must not take away the very essence of a right. . . 
(2) There must be sufficient factual basis for believing that there was a real danger to 
the interest which the State claims there was a pressing social need to protect. .. 
(3) The State's measure or act must interfere with the right in question no more than is 
reasonably necessary in order to achieve the ultimate legitimate aim ... 
(4) Measures are likely to be regarded as disproportionate if they impose heavy 
burdens on one individual or group, apparently arbitrarily, in order to achieve a 
social benefit, or if they impose penalties which appear to be excessive in relation 
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compatibility and the Joint Committee Reports on Bills have a similar role to the NZ 
section 7 reports although the addition of the Joint Committee greatly extends the 
scrutiny process by adding a second parliamentary tier of scrutiny. 
B Limitations in the Procedure 
The section 19 procedure contains features which weaken its effectiveness in a 
manner comparable to the NZ model. However, the UK procedure is more effective 
overall. Firstly, in NZ, where the Attorney-General does not consider there to be any 
unjustified limitations on BORA rights in a Bill, no report is made. By contrast, in 
the UK, a section 19 statement is required for every Government Bill. Moreover, the 
section 19 obligation has given rise to a much more stringent test than that adopted in 
NZ pursuant to section 7. As discussed, a Minister treats section 19(a) as requiring a 
"positive statement of compatibility."79 The House will therefore always be made 
aware where there are any inconsistencies with Convention rights. In contrast, the NZ 
Parliament is told only of inconsistencies which are regarded as unjustified in a free 
and democratic society. 80 The section 19 procedure is thus primafacie more likely to 
give fuller effect to the objectives of legislative consistency with the HRA and 
informing Parliament of potential inconsistencies. 
On the other hand, where section 7 reports are made, the Attorney-General does 
table in the House the reasons for finding a Bill inconsistent with the BORA. These 
reasons effectively comprise the legal advice given to the Attorney-General. In 
contrast, section 19 never requires disclosure of the advice given to Ministers. 
Likewise, statements of compatibility contain only the view that a Bill is consistent 
to the circumstances of the offence to which they relate .. . 
(5) The effectiveness of any legal controls over the measures in question , and the 
adequacy of compensation or legal remedies for those affected by the measures, 
will be relevant to the proportionality of any interference. 
(6) All these matters fall to be assessed in the light of the circumstances, and must be 
reassessed when circumstances change. 
79Lord Chancellor's Department The Human Rights Act 1998 Guidance for Departments, para 36 
<http:/ /www.humanrights.gov.uk / guidance.htm> (last accessed 19 June 2002). 
80Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation 2000 edition: 
Chapter 4: New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and Human Rights Act 1993, para 4.1.1 
<http: //www.justice.govt.nz / lac / pubs / 2001 / legislative_guide_2000/ chapter_4.html> (last 
accessed 18 June 2002); New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s5. 
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with the Convention - no reasons are given.
8 1 
In practice, some effort has been made to resolve this limitation. Firstly, a 
Minister is required to be able to "give a general outline of the arguments which led 
him or her to the conclusion reflected in the statement,"
82 although confidentiality of 
the advice itself prevents any effective check on this policy. As well, since January 
2002, the explanatory note of every government Bill has had to acknowledge the main 
Convention issues raised.
83 Finally, the Guidance for Departments is more detailed 
than its NZ counterpait so that the process of establishing incompatibility is more 
transparent. 84 An example of this can be demonstrated by examining departmental 
guidelines in relation to a particular Convention right. In order to establish that 
A1ticle 1085 is affected by the proposed legislation, the legislation must be deemed to 
affect a person's freedom of expression . 
86 The Guidelines set out the coverage of the 
article, including situations in which the right may be restricted.
87 Instructions for 
domestic courts regai·ding relief which may affect the right are also set out.
88 As well, 
the Strasbourg Comt' s attitude to Article 10 analysis is summaiised as follows:
89 
Decisions of the Convention institutions in Strasbourg have recognised the 
fundamental place of the Article 10 right to freedom of expression. The European 
Court of Human Rights has acknowledged that freedom of expression constitutes an 
81 The Human Rights Act 1998 Guidance for Departments, above, Annex A. 
82 The Human Rights Act 1998 Guidance for Departments, above, para 39. 
8
' The Lord Chancellor (18 December 2001) 630 HLD no 43. 
84 Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation 2000 edition: Chapter 4: New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 and Human Rights Act 1993, above; Lord Chancellor's Department The Human 
Rights Act 1998 Guidance for Departments <http: //www.humanrights.gov.uk/ guidance.htm> 
(last accessed 19 June 2002) . 
"' European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 10, provides: 
l. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information an ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from 
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may 
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of 
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
86 The Human Rights Act 1998 Guidance for Departments, above, para 65. 
87 The Human Rights Act 1998 Guidance for Departments, above, para 65. 
88 The Human Rights Act 1998 Guidance for Departments, above, para 66. 
89 Lord Chancellor's Department The Human Rights Act 1998 Guidance for Departments, para 67 
<http: / / www.humanrights.gov.uk / guidance.htm> (last accessed 19 June 2002). 
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essential foundation of a democratic society and is particularly important as far as the 
press is concerned. 
The issues considered and tests applied by Departments in undertaking scrutiny 
of the Bill are extensively prescribed and therefore transparent and fairly consistent. 
In contrast, in order to establish that a Bill breaches the freedom of expression right in 
NZ,90 departmental guidelines state broadly about all democratic and civil rights 
that: 91 
The democratic system is based on the recognition of these inherent rights: the rights to 
freedom of expression (including the freedom not to say anything), peaceful assembly, 
association, thought, conscience and religious belief, movement, the right to practice 
your religion or beliefs and the right to vote and be a candidate for Parliament. 
Here, the process of establishing inconsistency with the right is impossible to 
ascertain in much detail. Furthermore, that process may vary considerably between 
Bills. Since neither the NZ nor the UK procedures require reasons for their 
assessment of proposed legislation in all cases, it can be concluded that both are 
unsatisfactory in terms of transparency. However, the extensive prescription of 
procedure under the UK model does provide a safeguard to ameliorate the effects of 
this drawback. Confidentiality is in direct opposition to the objective of informing the 
public and Parliament of limitations that proposed legislation places on international 
human rights. Consequently, this feature significantly impedes the effectiveness of 
both parliamentary scrutiny processes. 
In the same way as the section 7 process, the section 19 process takes place 
before a Bill's Second Reading and is not an ongoing requirement. 92 This raises 
similar concerns regarding the compatibility of later amendments as have been 
outlined above. The problem is redeemed to some extent in the UK in that the 
explanatory notes to Bills are updated twice in the legislative process in relation to the 
Convention issues they raise.93 However, this change alone can not adequately 
9() New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, section 14, provides: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek 
receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form. 
9 1 Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation 2000 edition: 
Chapter 4: New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and Human Rights Act 1993, para 4.1.2 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz/ lac / pubs/2001 / legislative_guide_2000 / chapter_ 4.html> (last 
accessed 18 June 2002). 
92Human Rights Act 1998, sl9. 
93(19 March 2002) 632 HLD no. 127. 
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achieve the goal of fully informing Parliament and the public of potential legislative 
HRA breaches. 
Like section 7 BORA, section 19 HRA does not apply to delegated legislation.94 
It has been determined above that this issue exceeds the scope of this paper. 
However, it should be mentioned that this limitation is addressed in the UK by the 
Guidance for Departments. The Guidance recommends that Ministers nevertheless 
give their view on compatibility "as a matter of good practice."95 
A major limitation of the UK procedure which is not evident in the NZ 
equivalent is that section 19 applies only to Government Bills.96 That the provision 
does not encompass Private Members' Bills severely impedes its effectiveness by 
failing to provide for any parliamentary scrutiny of those Bills. This is also an 
arbitrary omission from the scrutiny process since Private Members' Bills are 
legislative acts and thus are equally bound by the international obligations enshrined 
in the HRA.97 In sum, while the model adopted in compliance with section 19 
contains similar weaknesses to the NZ section 7 model, the effectiveness of the 
fo1mer has been immeasurably improved by the advent of the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Human Rights. 
C The Impact of the Joint Committee 
The Joint Committee was set up in January 2001 98 in response to the British 
Government's view that a Parliamentary Committee would be the best way to enable 
Parliament to play a leading role in protecting human rights. 99 In addition, the 
problems of independence which arise where the task of scrutinising Government 
94 No instruments other than Bills are referred to in section 19. (Human Rights Act 1998, s19). 
95 Lord Chancellor's Department The Human Rights Act 1998 Guidance for Departments, para 40 
<http:/ /www.humanrights.gov.uk/guidance.htm> (last accessed 19 June 2002). 
%Human Rights Act 1998, s19; The Human Rights Act 1998 Guidance for Departments, above, 
para 38. 
97 Anthony Lester QC "The Magnetism of the Human Rights Act 1998," (Speech to Roles and 
Perspectives on the Law Conference, Victoria University, Wellington, 4-5 April 2002) 18. 
98Anthony Lester QC "Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation Under the Human Rights Act 
1998" (Speech to New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Victoria University, Wellington, 9 
April 2002) 5, fn 19. 
99 Rights Brought Home: the Human Rights Bill (1997) CM 3782, para3.6. 
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legislation is carried out solely by the government are significantly reduced by having 
a Parliamentary check on the process. 
100 The Joint Committee has had a huge impact 
on the ability of the section 19 process to uphold Convention guarantees in legislation. 
Specifically, it has greatly enhanced Parliament's awareness of where it has proposed 
legislation which 1s inconsistent with the Convention, and has allowed for more 
informed debates m this regard. The primary way in which the Joint Committee 
enhances the ability of section 19 to meet its objectives and those of the HRA as a 
whole is by providing a check on the section 19 process. 
One of the maJor drawbacks identified in relation to both the NZ and UK 
processes was the Jack of checks they incorporate. This is an especially important 
concern given the necessarily subjective nature of the tests for consistency applied to 
Bills. The problem manifests itself in the inability of the public and the legislature to 
gain access to the reasons for conclusions on consistency. The Joint Committee tables 
in Parliament detailed reports on Bills, which analyse their compatibility with the 
HRA. As such, they extensively check the Minister' s section 19 statement. The 
extensive nature of this check is illustrated by the scope of the Joint Committee's 
investigations. These include, 
101 
the power to require the submission of written evidence and documents, to examine 
witnesses, to meet at any time (except when Parliament is prorogued or dissolved), to 
adjourn from place to place within the United Kingdom no more than four times in any 
calendar year, to appoint specialist advisers, and to make Reports to both Houses. 
The conclusions drawn by the Joint Committee from the Bill under analysis include 
an assessment of whether or not the section 19 statement has been correctly made.
102 
Conclusions have also become increasingly detailed over time, for example, the 
recent report on the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill 1°
3 outlined fourteen 
very specific human rights concerns raised by the BilI.
104 These concerns included, 
for instance, "the implications of depriving someone of Btitish citizenship, apart from 
100 David Kinley "Parliamentary Scrutiny of Human Rights: A Duty Neglected?" in Philip 
Alston (ed) Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1999) 158, 166-167. 
101Joint Committee on Human Rights, First Report, Session 2001-02, Homelessness Bill, (7 
November 2001) . 
102Joint Committee on Human Rights, First Report, Session 2001-02, above, para 12. 
'
03Joint Committee on Human Rights Seventeenth Report, Session 2001-02, Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Bill, (21 June 2002). 
'IJ.IJoint Committee on Human Rights Seventeenth Report, Session 2001-02, above, para 112. 
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their immjgration rights,"
105 and "the reluctance of the Government to recognise the 
absolute nature of the obligation to avoid treating people in ways that would amount 
to degrading treatment contrary to ECHR Article 3."
106 Thus the reports constitute a 
rigorous critique of the section 19 statement, which is then drawn to the attention of 
Parliament and consequently made available to the public.
107 The Minister's legal 
advice is not revealed, but he or she is required to answer written questions from the 
Joint Committee to assist them in their investigations.
108 The Minister must therefore 
account to Parliament, albeit indirectly, and the public for his or her conclusion as to 
Convention compatibility. In this way, the problems of transparency and 
accountability are solved without interfering with the doctrine of legal professional 
privilege. 
The detail of the Joint Committee Reports mean that they are not only helpful in 
meeting objectives in relation to informing debate on legislative compliance with 
Convention rights. Because they point to specific Convention issues, the reports also 
allow Bills to be easily amended to make them more Convention-consistent. As a 
result, the Joint Committee Reports at least have the potential to enhance significantly 
the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny in promoting both debate and legislative 
compliance with the Convention. 
Also demonstrated as limiting the effectiveness of sections 7 and 19 was the fact 
that the scrutiny requirements are not ongoing. The Joint Committee has rectified this 
problem to the extent that it has decided to examine and report to the House on any 
amendments made subsequent to the section 19 statement.
109 This will significantly 
promote the potential for Bills to become legislation which is consistent with human 
rights. 
As discussed above, section 19 applies only to Government Bills and does not 
'
0'Joint Committee on Human Rights Seventeenth Report, Session 2001-02, above, 112. 
"'"Joint Committee on Human Rights Seventeenth Report, Session 2001-02, above, 112. 
'
07 Joint Committee reports can be found at 
<http:/ /www.parliament.uk/commons/selcom/hrhome.htm> 
'
08Joint Committee on Human Rights Seventeenth Report, Session 2001-02, Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Bill, (21 June 2002) para 4. 
'
09Joint Committee on Human Rights, First Report, Session 2000-01, Criminal Justice and 
Police Bill 2001, (26 April 2001) para 1. 
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require scrutiny of Private Members' Bills. Nevertheless, the Joint Committee has 
decided to assess these Bills for compatibility questions. 110 They are subject to Jess 
rigorous scrutiny than Government Bills. The Joint Committee justifies this by 
pointing out that many do not make much progress through the legislative process.
111 
Moreover, the Joint Committee believes that the sponsors of Private Members' Bills 
are unlikely to be resourced to answer their questions relating to compatibility, 
although no reasons for this belief are given. 112 The latter in particular does not 
appear to be a very principled reason for allowing proposed legislation a greater 
opportunity to proceed through the legislative process containing encroachments on 
human rights. However, the Joint Committee's decision to scrutinise Private 
Members' Bills, at least to some extent, does improve the effectiveness of the section 
19 parliamentary scrutiny process by ensuring that it applies to a greater proportion of 
proposed legislation. 
The procedure adopted pursuant to section 19 of the HRA contains many of the 
same features and limitations as the equivalent NZ procedure. However, the Joint 
Committee has effectively addressed many of these limitations, significantly 
improving the potential for informed debate about legislative consistency with the 
HRA and con-espondingly improving the chances of legislative compliance with the 
rights contained in the Act. Overall, the advent of the Joint Committee has impacted 
enormously on the effectiveness of the section 19 HRA parliamentary scrutiny 
process. As a result mainly of the Joint Committee, it is clear that the UK 
parliamentary scrutiny process has far more potential than its NZ equivalent to enable 
legislation to be passed which is consistent with human rights. The UK legislature 
thus gives greater effect to the international human rights instruments to which it is a 
pa11y. The Joint Committee has also been able to provide Parliament and the public 
with more information and opportunity to debate the treatment of human rights by the 
legislature than has the NZ section 7 model. 
"
0Joint Committee on Human Rights, Fourteenth Report, Session 2001-02, Scrutiny of Bills: 
Private Members' Bills and Private Bills, (8 March 2002) paras 4-5. 
'"Joint Committee on Human Rights, Fourteenth Report, Session 2001-02, above, para 3. 
112Joint Committee on Human Rights, Fourteenth Report, Session 2001-02, above, para 3. 
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IV PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
As discussed, section 7 BORA itself is broad enough in scope to enable 
parliamentary scrutiny of proposed legislation to be effective. As a result, this paper 
need not recommend amendments to the provision itself. However, alterations could 
be made to the procedure adopted pursuant to section 7 which would greatly enhance 
its ability to fulfill the objectives of section 7 and the BORA as a whole. This would 
require changes in practice and change to the Attorney-General's Memorandum. 113 
Firstly, section 7 obligates the Attorney-General to report where there appear to 
be inconsistencies with a Bill, 114 not only where those inconsistencies appear to be 
unjustified in terms of section 5. 115 There is no objection to the Attorney-General 
making a section 5 assessment, however Parliament and the public should be made 
aware of any inconsistencies in the interests of effectiveness and of fulfilling the 
section 7 obligation. Access to such information would also lessen the problems 
created by the subjective nature of the section 7 test. Lowering the threshold of the 
test for whether to report may risk the consequence that "numerous reports of minor, 
technical, or otherwise unimportant inconsistencies with the Bill of Rights would have 
to be made." 116 Regardless of the validity of that concern, deciding whether human 
rights violations are justifiable is the function of Parliament. Therefore, the risk is 
outweighed by the need for transparency in the scrutiny process. Another objection to 
more frequent reporting is that the threat of a section 7 report would be undermined in 
its capacity to deter the legislature from proposing Bills which may breach human 
· h 11 7 ng ts. But again , openness of the scrutiny process is of primary importance. 
Parliament must be able to decide on whether breaches are justified so the public can 
check such decisions. Deterrance is at the most a subsidiary goal. This change would 
not require alterations to the Memorandum but merely that all BORA vets which 
identify an inconsistency be drawn to the attention of the House of Representatives as 
113 Memorandum entitled "Monitoring Bills for Compliance with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990" from Attorney-General to all Ministers and Chief Executives, 9 April 1991. 
11
• New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s7. 
11 5 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s5. 
11 6 Grant Huscroft "The Attorney-General, the Bill of Rights, and the Public Interest" in G 
Huscroft and P Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms: The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
and the Human Rights A ct 1993 (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 133, 139. 
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a matter of practice. 
It is further recommended that the Attorney-General's Memorandum prescribe 
m detail the process by which assessment of Bills' consistency with the BORA is 
made. As recognised earlier, the procedure is only broadly set out in the LAC 
guidelines. 11 8 More extensive prescription in the Memorandum such as that found in 
the UK Guidance for Departments 11 9 would provide for a more consistent approach to 
vetting. This would consequently enhance the transparency of the process, without 
interfering with legal professional privilege. 
The establishment of the Joint Committee has substantially improved the 
effectiveness of section 19 of the HRA relative to what had been a procedure 
comparable to that adopted under section 7 of the BORA. A similar committee was 
suggested by the NZ Justice and Law Reform Committee when considering the 
proposed BORA, 120 but was never established. The recommended Parliamentary 
select committee was to operate in addition to the Attorney-General's section 7 
repo11ing requirements . That is , it was foreseen that "the bill of 1ights could require 
the Attorney-General to certify on the face of a bill when the Attorney-General 
considers that the bill derogates from the bill of rights , and the select committee of 
Parliament to take similar action and report to the House on provisions in any Bill that 
appeared contrary to the principles and specific articles in the Bill of Rights ." 121 Such 
a committee should be established in NZ to improve the effectiveness of pre-
legislative scrutiny. Specifically, adding an extra and separate tier of scrutiny would, 
as it has in the UK, substantially improve the accountability of the process. It would 
also counteract the fact that the Attorney-General ' s role is not enforceable, by 
providing information relating to legislative compliance even where the Attorney-
117 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 1052. 
118 Legislation Ad visory Committee Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation 2000 edition: 
Chapter 4: New Zen/and Bill of Rights Act 1990 and Human Rights Act 1993 
<http: / / www.justice .gov t.nz/ lac/ pubs/2001/ legisla tive_guide_2000/ chapter_4.html> (las t 
accessed 18 June 2002). 
'
19 Lord Chancellor's Department The Human Rights Act 1998 Guidance for Departments 
<http:/ / www.humanrights.gov. uk/guidance.htm> (last accessed 19 June 2002) . 
120 Justice and Law Reform Committee "Final Report on a White Paper on a Bill of Rights for 
New Zealand (1987-90) AJHR I Sc, 11 . 
121 Justice and Law Reform Committee, above, 3. 
27 
General decides not to report. Also as in the UK, the select committee would be free 
to report regarding amendments made after the section 7 process has taken place, thus 
rectifying problems arising as a result of the section 7 requirements not being 
ongoing. Finally, the transparency of the process in terms of assessing the existence 
and extent of derogations from human rights would be enhanced and scrutinised, 
again without interfering with legal professional p1ivilege. 
The outcome of these changes would be to enhance the effectiveness of the 
section 7 process, using the UK model as a guide. That is, the process would be of 
more assistance to the legislature in its duty to uphold human rights. The process 
would also be improved in its ability to inform public and parliamentary debate in 
relation to potential derogations from those rights. The existence of section 4 
BORA 122 and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty prevent compulsory 
compliance with the BORA. However, an improved section 7 procedure and a 
Parliamentary select committee could at least ensure that any derogations are made 
with maximum awareness, transparency and consequent accountability to the NZ 
electorate. 
122New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s4. 
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VI APPENDIX 
8 April 1991 
ALL MINISTERS 
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Monitoring Bills for Compliance with the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
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1 Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 places the Attorney-
General under an obligation to draw to the attention of the House any 
provision in a Bill that appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights and 
freedoms contained in the Act. 
2 Such a report is made -
(a) In the case of a Government Bill, on its introduction; and 
(b) In the case of any other Bill , as soon as practicable after its 
introduction. 
3 So that the Attorney-General can make such a report where that is appropriate, 
Bills will have to be monitored for compliance with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. Accordingly, an interim procedure (which will be reviewed 
at the end of 1991) has been put in place for the monitoring of Bills. 
4 An outline of the procedure is as follows: 
(1) The procedure applies to all Bills (other than Imprest Supply Bills and 
Appropriation Bills as they are basically standard form Bills made up 
of provisions that would not be inconsistent with any of the rights and 
freedoms contained in the ew Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990). 
34 
(2) Where a Government Bill (other than an Imprest Supply Bill or an 
Appropriation Bill) reaches the drafting stage, Parliamentary Counsel 
will refer that Government Bill to the Department of Justice (unless 
that Government Bill is being promoted by the Department of Justice) 
so that an officer of the Law Reform Division of that department can 
consider whether any provision of that Government Bill appears to be 
inconsistent with any of the 1ights and freedoms contained in the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
(3) Where a Government Bill that is being promoted by the Department of 
Justice reaches the drafting stage, Parliamentary Counsel will refer that 
Government Bill to the Crown Law Office so that an officer of the 
Crown Law Office can consider whether any provision of the 
Government Bill appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights and 
freedoms contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
(4) Where the Parliamentary Counsel who refers a Government Bill to the 
Department of Justice or the Crown Law Office considers that any 
provision of that Government Bill may be inconsistent with any of the 
rights and freedoms contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990, that Parliamentary Counsel shall , in referring the Bill , identify 
that provision. 
(5) Where a Bill that is not a Government Bill is introduced, the 
Department of Justice will examine that Bill as soon as practicable 
after its introduction . 
(6) Where, on examination , no prov1s1on of the Bill appears to be 
inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms contained in the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, the officer who conducts the 
examination shall -
(a) In the case of a Government Bill , so inform the Parliamentary 
Counsel who is drafting the Bill; and 
(b) In any other case and the Chief Parliamentary Counsel. 
35 
(7) Where, on examination, any provision of a Bill appears to be 
inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms contained in the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, the officer who conducts the 
examination shall -
(a) In the case of a Government Bill, report accordingly both to the 
Attorney-General and to the Parliamentary Counsel who is drafting 
the Bill; and 
(b) In any other case, report accordingly both to the Attorney-General 
and to the Chief Parliamentary Counsel. 
5 The Department of Justice is to examine Government Bills because it has the 
necessary expertise. The Crown Law Office is to examine Bills promoted by 
the Department of Justice to avoid any perception of conflict of interest. 
6 If a department requires information about the ambit of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990, it should direct its inquiries to the Law Reform Division 
of the Department of Justice. 
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